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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an interlocutory discovery order
of the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah,
entered by the Honorable Frank G. Noel.

This Court granted

Gold Standard, Inc. ("Gold Standard") permission to appeal the
District Court's Order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 5 on
July 6, 1989.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Texaco

and

Getty

disagree

with

Gold

Standard's

characterization of the issues presented in this appeal. The
issues this Court should decide are legal issues, not factual
issues.

Gold Standard's statement of issues is so burdened

by factual assertions which are contrary to the district
court's findings and the facts set forth in the Record as to
make the statement confusing and misleading.

The overall

question is simply stated:
Did the district court abuse its discretion in ruling
that two memoranda, which it determined were created by Getty
in anticipation of litigation and as a direct result of
specific threats by Gold Standard, are protected under the
work product doctrine of Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)?
This determination will require the Court to consider the
following questions of law and mixed questions of law and
fact:
1. Can the work product doctrine of Rule 26(b) (3) apply
to documents created in anticipation of litigation by a party
or

its representative

supervision?

without proof

of direct

attorney

2.

Is opinion work product discoverable simply by

demonstrating "substantial need" and "under hardship?"
3.

Can a party meet the "substantial need" and "undue

hardship" test of Rule 26(b)(3) by making conclusory and
unsupported claims that it needs the work product documents
and that it cannot obtain the information elsewhere?
4.
finding

Did the district court abuse its discretion in
that

Getty

did

not

intentionally

and

knowingly

relinquish its right to assert its work product protection?
5.

Does the district court have the authority to

control informal discovery and prevent a party from invading
its opponent's work product rights through ex parte contact
with the opponent's former employees?
CONTROLLING RULE
Rule 26(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the
provisions of Subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a
party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible
things otherwise discoverable under Subdivision
(b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party or
by or for that other party/s representative
(including his attorney, consultant, surety,
indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing
that the party seeking discovery has substantial
need of the materials in the preparation of his case
and that he is unable without undue hardship to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials
by other means.
In ordering discovery of such
materials when the required showing has been made,
the court shall protect against disclosure of the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of
a party concerning the litigation.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In early 1987, Gold Standard obtained copies of two
memoranda from Richard Klatt, a former employee of Getty, who
took copies of the documents with him when he left Getty's
employ.

R. at 2924-25.

[The two documents are:

Memorandum

from Charles J. Kundert to John M. Mintz dated July 13, 1984;
and Memorandum from John M. Mintz to H. Edward Wendt dated
July 16, 1984 (hereafter referred to collectively as the
"Memoranda") (copy included in Addendum as Item Number 1)].
On June 1, 1987, Gold Standard's counsel met ex parte with
Charles Kundert, the author of the principal memorandum and
obtained his affidavit concerning the Memoranda.
When Getty learned of Gold Standard's ex parte contacts
with Getty's former employees, Getty recognized the potential
threat to its rights and privileges and sought an order from
the district court, restricting such ex parte contacts. The
Court denied Getty's motion, but ruled that the ex parte
contacts must not jeopardize Getty's privileges.

R. at 13 4 0

(copy of Memorandum Decision re Ex Parte Contacts dated April
6, 1988 included in Addendum as Item Number 2).
After Getty learned that the Memoranda were created by
its employees as a direct result of Gold Standard's threats
and in anticipation of litigation, it filed a motion for
protective order.

The court granted

Getty's Motion on

November 18, 1988 (Minute Entry attached to Addendum as Item
Number 3), and it issued a Memorandum Decision dated November
23, 1988, summarizing its conclusions.

(Copy of Memorandum

Decision included as Addendum Item Number 4).

In its Memorandum Decision, the Court ruled that "the
documents

in

question

are

work

product

prepared

in

anticipation of litigation." R. at 3262. The court concluded
that "Getty has not waived its right to assert the work
product doctrine with regard to the[] documents." R. at 3 2 62.
The

court

determined

that

Getty

had

taken

"reasonable

precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosure of protected
documents," especially "where the documents in question were
obtained from Getty's files by a former Getty employee, and
thereby ultimately made available to opposing counsel." Id.
The court considered Getty's timeliness in bringing its motion
and ruled that "defendants have not acted in a dilatory manner
either in coming to a knowledge of the importance of the
documents in question or subsequently seeking their return."
R. at 3261.
The court recognized the inter-relation between its
ability to manage discovery in the case and Getty's right to
claim work product protection for the two documents:
The Court has previously ruled in this case that
plaintiffs' counsel may unilaterally make contacts
with former Getty employees. In order for that
position to be sound, the Court must be able to
enforce the protections of the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine where
documents falling within those protections are
obtained by opposing counsel during those unilateral
contacts.
R. at 3261.
Finally,

the

court

considered

and

rejected

Gold

Standard's argument that the court had no ability to prevent
Gold Standard from invading Getty's privileges and protections
through

informal discovery.

It recognized

that such a

position would render the Court "helpless to enforce the work
product doctrine as to any documents that were obtained by
whatever means, outside of formal discovery."

Id.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In

1973, Getty

and

Gold

Standard

entered

into an

Operating Agreement respecting mining claims near Mercur,
Utah.

Under the Agreement, Getty owned a 7 5% undivided

interest and Gold Standard held the remaining 25%.

Getty

agreed to pay all of the expenses during the exploration phase
of the agreement, except that the parties would share in the
expense of a feasibility study to determine if they should
proceed with development of a producing mine.

Under the

Operating Agreement, if the parties agreed to commence with
the development of the property, they would enter Phase II of
the project and each would be required to fund its share of
the development expenses as they were incurred.

If either

party failed to pay its share of the expenses, its interest
would be converted under the agreement to a net profits
interest equal to 60% of the party's participating interest.
In October, 1980, management responsibility

for the

Mercur project was transferred from Los Angeles to Salt Lake
City.

In the summer of 1981, nine months after the transfer

of responsibility to Salt Lake, Getty gave Gold Standard the
final Bechtel Engineering Study ("Final Bechtel Study") and
several

internal

Getty

memoranda.

Getty

informed

Gold

Standard that these documents "form the Feasibility Study
defined in the Operating Agreement." R. at 2617

(Letter from

Getty to Gold Standard included in Addendum as Item Number 9) .

After reviewing the materials, Gold Standard paid for its
share of the cost of the Final Bechtel Study, which it was
only obligated to do if the Bechtel Report constituted the
feasibility study under the Operating Agreement.
The

parties

then

mutually

agreed

to

proceed

with

development of a mine and to begin sharing the costs incurred
in development of the project.
Standard,

Getty

contracted

international construction

with

After agreeing with Gold
Davy

McKee

(a

large,

firm) to construct the mining

complex at a cost in excess of $80 million. Gold Standard was
required to pay 25% of the costs of the project as incurred
in order to remain a participating interest holder.

Gold

Standard was unable, however, to fund its share of the project
and, pursuant to the Operating Agreement, was converted to a
net profits interest holder early in 1982.

Getty continued

to develop the project on its own, at a cost in excess of $80
million, and began production in 1983. Thereafter, Getty and
its successors began to make annual net profits payments to
Gold Standard as required under the Operating Agreement.
Gold Standard's Threatening Letter to Getty
After production commenced at Mercur, Texaco acquired
Getty.

Shortly thereafter, Gold Standard wrote to Texaco,

informing it of Gold Standard's allegations and asserting:
[W]e feel that Getty's treatment of Gold Standard
during the last few years has been manifestly
improper and unfair under the circumstances, and
completely contrary to our understanding of the
intent of the 1973 Operating Agreement . . . .
Gold Standard is still of the view that, as a
legal matter, the "feasibility study" which is
contemplated by the above-quoted portions of our
Agreement with Getty means . . . one which would be

acceptable by the SEC and by the various investment
and commercial bankers . . . • As we see it, Getty
Mining Company has failed to provide Gold Standard
with such a "feasibility study" as specified by the
Operating Agreement, and, legally speaking the
parties as [sic] still in "Phase I" under that
Agreement.
R. at 2604-03 (copy included in Addendum as Item Number 10).
In addition to its letter, Gold Standard enclosed a copy
of two other letters.

One of the letters was a ten-page

letter to Gold Standard from its legal counsel describing
"where [Gold Standard] stand[s] with Getty at this time from
a general legal point of view."

R. at 2615 (Letter from

Robert S. McConnell to Scott L. Smith included in Addendum as
Item Number 11) . The letter to Gold Standard from its counsel
stated, in part:
Getty therefore, appears to have knowingly pursued
a course of action which has been a continuing
obstacle to your being able to fund a 2 5%
participating interest in the project.
Their
conduct has been manifestly unfair under the
circumstances and completely contrary to my
understanding of the intent of the parties in
entering into the Operating Agreement . . . .
Their action may also amount to an interference
with your business relationships and a repudiation
of the basic Operating Agreement.
*

*

*

I am very much of the view that an excellent case
could be made that under the circumstances the
Bechtel Report, together with the internal Getty
memoranda and the related correspondence to date,
does not amount to a "feasibility study" as
contemplated by the Operating Agreement and that,
legally speaking, the parties are still in "Phase
I" under the Agreement.
*

*

*

[B]ased upon my review it is my feeling that
have good cause to complain about the treatment
have received from Getty and in my view you have
basis of a possible legal action against Getty

you
you
the
for

the damages Gold Standard has obviously suffered and
will continue to suffer as a result of the basic
unfairness towards Gold Standard which I have
described above.
R. at 2613, 2611, 2607-06 (emphasis added) (Item Number 11).
Upon receiving Scott Smith's letter, the recipient Willis
B. Reals, a senior Texaco vice-president, wrote to H.E. Wendt,
President of Getty Mining Company in Los Angeles, concerning
the matter.

In his letter, Reals explained:

The attached letter from Gold Standard Inc. dated
June 28, 1984 discusses the claims that Gold
Standard is making on Getty Mining Company in
connection with the Mercur gold mine.
Although you and I have discussed various facets
of this problem from time to time, I would
appreciate your detailed reaction to this letter,
including legal advice. By copy of this letter to
Mr. W. C. Weitzel, Jr. [Texaco's General Counsel],
I would appreciate coordination between the Texaco
and Getty legal staffs on this subject.
R. at 2599 (emphasis added) (copy included in Addendum as Item
Number 12).
Accordingly, Jeffrey C. Collins, a Getty attorney in Salt
Lake City, and John M. Mintz, a Getty executive in Los
Angeles, among others, were asked to assist in assessing
Getty's position and in responding to Smith's letter.

In

undertaking these assignments, both understood that there was
a strong likelihood of litigation between Getty and Gold
Standard on issues respecting the Mercur Mine, including the
question of whether Getty provided Gold Standard with a proper
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feasibility study.1 R. at 2715-14, 2701 (Affidavit of John M.
Mintz at f 4, (included as Addendum Item Number 5) ; Affidavit
of Jeffrey C. Collins at %% 5-6, (included as Addendum Item
Number 6)).

Their work was conducted in accordance with this

understanding.

Id.

In response to Gold Standard's claim that it never
received a feasibility study, Mintz instructed Charles J.
Kundert, a minerals engineering manager for Getty, to review
the Los Angeles files and determine, based on those documents,
whether or not a feasibility study had been prepared and given
to Gold Standard during the time that the Mercur Mine was
under Mintz's management

in Los Angeles.

(This would

encompass the period prior to October 1, 1980). In responding
to Mintz's request, Kundert reviewed the Los Angeles files and
prepared a memorandum to Mintz dated July 13, 1984 which
provided a summary of his understanding of the document
chronology and a conclusion, based upon his own personal
opinion and interpretation of the documents he reviewed.
Mintz

then

prepared

a

memorandum

both

summarizing

and

enclosing Kundert's memorandum, and sent it to Wendt on July
16, 1984.

R. at 2714 (Mintz Aff. at H

6-7). On the basis

of more complete information provided by those with direct

Also in response to Reals' request, Texaco attorney Amy
Etherington wrote to Jeff Collins requesting his "legal analysis
of Gold Standard's views as represented in [Scott Smith's June 28,
1984 letter]" and "legal advice of how Texaco should respond to the
above-mentioned letter." Record at 2589 (Exhibit 632).
2
It appears that Kundert was simply unaware of the facts
and communications referred to above which led up to the request
to Mintz, and understood only that he was responding to a
management inquiry from Mintz. R. at 2644, 2647.

knowledge of the circumstances surrounding delivery of the
feasibility study, Wendt later responded on behalf of Texaco
to Smith's letter.

R. at 2600-01 (Letter from H.E. Wendt to

Scott L. Smith dated October 25, 1984) (included in Addendum
as Item Number 13).
Significantly, Kundert did not review the documents given
to

Gold

Standard

in

July

1981

which

Getty

maintains

constituted the feasibility study (none of these documents
even existed during the time period covered by Kundert's
review). 3 R. at 2642 (Kundert Depo. at 57). Based only on
the documents he reviewed, Kundert came to a qualified
conclusion that a feasibility study had not been completed
prior to the spring of 1981. At the same time, he emphasized
that "[w]e have no knowledge of what documents were submitted
to Gold Standard to satisfy the requirement of the Agreement."
R. at 2637.
After Gold Standard filed this lawsuit, it obtained
copies of the Kundert and Mintz memoranda through ex parte
contact with another former Getty employee, Richard Klatt.
Klatt saw the documents while employed at Getty and took

Kundert acknowledged this fact in his memorandum: "We have
no knowledge of what documents were submitted to Gold Standard to
satisfy the requirement of the Agreement." Mintz explained in his
memorandum to Wendt that Kundert was ask to review Los Angeles
files covering the time when the project was under Los Angeles
management and that the review did not include the feasibility
study given to Gold Standard in July 1981: "The Los Angeles staff
was not involved in the project to any major extent after the
project was transferred to Salt Lake City. We did not receive a
copy of the Bechtel report . . . . " R. at 3188 (Item Number 1).

copies of them with him when he left Getty.

Klatt is now a

paid consultant for Gold Standard. R. at 2633-32 (Deposition
of Scott L. Smith at 2065-67).

After Gold Standard obtained

copies of these memoranda, their attorney contacted Kundert
and conducted an ex parte interview with him regarding his
memorandum. Following the interview, Gold Standard's attorney
prepared an affidavit and asked Kundert to sign it.
2 649-48 (Kundert Depo. at 41-42).

R. at

In his affidavit, Kundert

stated that some potential purchasers of the mine asked about
a feasibility study for Mercur and that he reviewed "files
concerning Mercur that had been maintained at Getty Mining
Company's Los Angeles office."

It later became evident that

Kundert merely speculated, incorrectly, that because the
request

from Mintz to review the

files came after the

questions were raised by visitors, Mintz must have been
responding to those questions.
After Texaco acquired Getty, it divested

itself of

Getty's mining properties, including the Mercur Mine in May,
1985.

As a result, most Getty employees who were associated

with the Mercur project no longer worked for Getty at the time
Gold Standard filed its lawsuit in December, 1986. This left

The issue of the propriety of Klatt taking these documents
from Getty was not fully developed in the district court. Klatt
admits that he made copies of the documents for his personal file
and took them when he left Getty. R. at 2926. Facts recently
discovered by Getty suggest that Klatt violated an agreement he
signed with Getty when he took the Memoranda.
If the court
determines that the propriety of Klatt removing the documents from
Getty is relevant to the outcome of this matter, it should remand
the matter to the district court so that the additional evidence
on this subject can be considered. See Affidavit of Louis C. Rove,
Jr. included in Addendum as Item Number 8.

Getty without any access to knowledge

of the chain of

communications that included the preparation and transmittal
of the Memoranda.

Specifically, Getty was unaware that the

Memoranda were prepared in direct response to Gold Standards
legal threats.
In September, 1987, prior to its first production of
documents to Gold Standard, Getty received a copy of Kundert's
Affidavit. R. at 2724 (Affidavit of Robert S. Clark, included
as Addendum Item Number 7) . Prior to receiving a copy of this
Affidavit, Getty was unaware that Kundert, a former Los
Angeles employee of Getty, had had any involvement with the
Mercur project after 1980. The explanation of the purpose for
the July 13, 1984 memorandum given by Kundert in his Affidavit
gave no indication that the memorandum was requested by
management in anticipation of litigation, nor is this fact
apparent from the memorandum itself.

Since Texaco and Getty

no longer had any employees with knowledge of the Gold
Standard situation, Getty was otherwise unfamiliar with the
circumstances surrounding the creation of the July 13, 1984
memorandum and had no reason to question the explanation
contained in Kundert's Affidavit.

R. at 2723.

Furthermore,

Gold Standard already had a copy of the memorandum prepared
by Kundert.
Based on Kundert's Affidavit and Gold Standard's prior
acquisition of the memoranda

from Klatt, Getty did not

recognize that the documents were created in anticipation of
litigation as a direct consequence of threats from Gold
Standard.

Only later did it become evident that Kundert was

simply in error when he guessed the reason Mintz asked for the
review of the Los Angeles documents.

R. at 2715 (Mintz Aff.

at 1 4).
Accordingly, in an extensive production of documents
beginning in December, 1987, and continuing into 1988, Getty
produced the two memoranda along with more than 49,000 pages
of documents.

Following this production, Getty first became

aware of the possible work product nature of the Memoranda in
June 1988. R. at 2722 (Clark Aff. at J 8) Getty immediately
informed Gold Standard of its concerns and promptly filed its
motion for protective order as soon as it was able verify its
5
concerns by meeting with a number of former employees.

Getty

filed its motion for a protective order as soon as its factual
inquiry confirmed the work-product nature of the Memoranda.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court correctly ruled that the Kundert and
Mintz Memoranda were created in anticipation of litigation
with Gold Standard.

Under Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), a

document must satisfy three tests to qualify as work product:
1) it must be a "document or tangible thing;" 2) it must be
"prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial;" and 3)
it must be prepared "by or for another party or by or for that
other party's representative." The Memoranda clearly satisfy
the first and third tests.

The sole question which the

Several former employees which Getty contacted to verify
its concerns, including John Mintz, the executive who asked Kundert
to prepare the memorandum, were out of the country for extended
periods of time when Getty initially attempted to contact them in
the summer of 1988. R. at 2722 (Clark Aff. at % 9).

district court had to resolve was whether or not they were
created "in anticipation of litigation."

The district court

correctly ruled that they were.
The Rule does not require the direct involvement of an
attorney. The doctrine is not designed to protect attorneys,
it is designed to protect the adversary system.

Although

attorneys typically take the laboring oar in preparing a case
for trial, the party and its employees frequently also play
substantial roles.

When a nonattorney employee creates

documents "in anticipation for litigation," those documents
deserve the same level of protection as documents generated
by attorneys covering the same subject matter.
The facts contained in work product documents can be
discovered only by proving "substantial need" and "undue
hardship." This exception to work product protection does not
apply

to

"mental

impressions, opinions, or conclusions"

contained in work product documents.

A substantial portion

of both of the memoranda involved in this case consist of
opinions,

conclusions,

and

mental

impressions

are

not

discoverable under this exception.
Gold Standard made absolutely no showing of substantial
need or undue hardship to the district court.

The burden of

satisfying the exception rests with Gold Standard.

The new

evidence and arguments it raises to this court do not satisfy
the exception either.
Getty did not waive its right to work product protection.
A waiver must be knowing and intentional.

As soon as Getty

gained knowledge of its right to work product protection, it
promptly asserted it.
The court has broad power to govern the pre-trial of a
case, including informal discovery.

In this case, Gold

Standard obtained work product documents through ex parte
contact with

Getty7s

former

employees.

The

court had

authority to remedy the resulting compromise of Getty's work
product rights and did not abuse its discretion in so ruling.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case was filed nearly three years ago.

Since that

time, the district court has been called upon repeatedly to
manage and control the discovery of the case and understand
the complex facts and procedural background.

Because such

discovery orders depend in large part on weighing and sifting
facts and understanding the procedural history of the case,
district courts are given broad discretion to rule on such
matters.

See, e.g., Bennion v. Utah State Bd. of Oil, Gas &

Mining, 675 P.2d 1135, 1144 (Utah 1983); National Hockey
League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642,
96 S. Ct. 2778, 2780 (1976).
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TWO MEMORANDA WERE CREATED IN ANTICIPATION OP LITIGATION
AND SHOULD BE PROTECTED WORK PRODUCT UNDER RULE 2 6(b)(3)
Getty agrees with Gold Standard that it is important for
this Court to fashion a standard for evaluating work product
such that the purposes behind work product protection are
furthered rather than frustrated.

The mechanistic approach
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recommended by Gold Standard, however, will only frustrate the
purposes

of

the work

product

protection

and

render

it

partially or wholly unavailable to many who are entitled to
its protection. Gold Standard's position requires abandonment
of much of Rule 26(b)(3) itself.

The Court in fashioning a

rule should begin by focusing on the express provisions of
2 6(b) (3) rather than ignoring them as Gold Standard advocates.
A.

The Work Product Doctrine is Designed to Protect the
Integrity of the Adversary System, Not to Cloak Attorneys
With an Exclusive Right to Privacy.
Texaco and Getty agree with Gold Standard that the work

product doctrine is designed to protect the integrity of the
adversary

system.

It

does

not

exist

to

produce

a

confidential relationship, but rather to promote the adversary
system

by

safeguarding

the

fruits

of

a

party's

trial

preparation from the discovery attempts of an opponent. Like
other rules designed to protect the adversary system, the
doctrine was designed to safeguard a client's interests, not
merely benefit the attorneys who work within the system.
The roots of the modern work product doctrine are
typically traced to the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S. Ct. 385 (1947).
Hickman, the Supreme Court recognized that

In

if documents

created in anticipation of litigation are open to an opposing
party on mere demand, much of what is usually put down in
writing will remain unwritten.

Inefficiency, unfairness and

In contrast, the attorney-client privilege is designed to
protect the relationship between the client and his attorney. This
relationship naturally requires the involvement of an attorney
before it becomes relevant.

sharp practices would inevitably develop. The Court fashioned
the work product protection to insure that parties to a case
can prepare independently, without fear that the other party
can automatically obtain the benefit of its preparatory work.
When the work product doctrine was recognized in Hickman
forty years ago, the legal system was considered the exclusive
domain of attorneys. The Hickman court spoke of the attorney
as sole protector of his client's interests.

It is not

surprising, therefore, that the Supreme Court in Hickman spoke
of protecting

an attorney's preparation

for litigation.

Nonattorney employees were rarely involved in case preparation
in more than a clerical function and there is no indication
in

Hickman

that

the

court considered
7
. . .

nonattorney involvement.

the

possibility

Significantly, the court has never

held that attorney involvement is required.
By 1970, however, courts had recognized that the party
itself and its nonattorney agents and employees often play a
critical role in the preparation of a case for trial.

As a

result, in 1970, Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure was amended to codify, clarify and extend the work

Although Hickman continues to provide useful guidance in
construing the modern work product doctrine, it must be used with
caution in interpreting Rule 26(b)(3), especially in construing the
extent to which the doctrine applies to the work product of
nonattorneys. As one court has stated: "The Hickman decision was
the seminal case in the development of what is now termed the workproduct doctrine. Rule 26(b)(3) preserves the essential portion
of the doctrine as announced in Hickman and resolves conflicts in
the post-Hickman cases. It also notably expands the doctrine by
extending discovery protection to the work-product of a party or
his agents and representatives, as well as that party's attorney."
Carver v. Allstate Ins. Co., 94 F.R.D. 131, 132 (S.D.Ga. 1982)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).

product protection established by Hickman and its progeny to
include the party itself and its agents.

Significantly, the

1970 amendment discarded the term "attorney work product" and
substituted in its place "documents and tangible things"
"prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or
for

another

party

or

by

or

for

that

other

party's

representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety,
indemnitor, insurer, or agent)."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).

Following the 1970 amendment, Utah adopted the amended Federal
Rule

26(b)(3),

incorporating

the

identical

work

product

language.8
Getty agrees that Hickman remains an important statement
of the purposes of the work product doctrine, with one
important caveat created by the 1970 amendment to the Rule:
the protection applies equally to the party himself or his
nonattorney agent if his or her efforts are "in anticipation
of litigation."

Gold Standard uses Hickman, not so much for

a statement of the purposes served by the doctrine, but to
point out that only attorneys are mentioned in Hickman.

Yet

that is precisely the aspect of Hickman which has been
expressly altered since that case was decided. Whether or not
the doctrine applied only to attorneys in 1947, such is not
the case today nor should it be. The policies underlying the
work product doctrine are equally served, regardless of
whether the party, his attorney or his nonattorney agent

Utah did not merely incorporate all of Rule 2 6 wholesale
into the Utah Rules. Prior to 1986, Utah's provisions in Rule 26
concerning experts differed considerably from the federal rule.

prepared

the

document, as

long

as

it was

anticipation of litigation or for trial,"

"created

in

Rule 26(b)(3).

This standard serves the adversary system by preventing the
opposing

party

from

unfairly

using

an

adversaries'

preparation.
Admittedly, some courts continue to refer to the rule as
the "attorney work product" rule.

It is not surprising that

courts and attorneys alike sometimes make such references
since the rule prior to 1970 used that phraseology.

Also,

even though the characterization as "attorney" work product
was deleted from the rule, the doctrine naturally is applied
most frequently to the work of attorneys.

As attorneys, it

may be easy, however, to forget the critical role many parties
and their nonattorney agents play in anticipating litigation
and preparing

for trial.

In light of the history and

development of the doctrine, no particular significance should
be taken from continued references to the doctrine as the
"attorney" work product rule.

The rule is one relating to

fairness in the adversarial process, not one which bestows
attorneys with an advantaged status.
B.

Work Product Protection is Available to all Litigants
Regardless of Whether Thev Employ an Attorney.
Gold Standard argues that direct attorney involvement is

necessary in the creation of a document before it can qualify

Gold Standard highlights the decisions of some courts which
still require direct attorney involvement, in disregard of the
plain intent of the 1970 amendment, eliminating such a requirement.
Gold Standard failed to note, however, that a number of courts and
commentators have criticized and rejected such an approach as
contrary to the clear intent of the amendment to the Rule. See,
e.g. cases cited infra at Section II.A., p. 35.

as work product under Rule 26(b)(3).

Such a rule certainly

offers a simple way to mechanistically eliminate protection
of the work product of many nonattorneys, but the approach is
simply wrong.
The Rules of Civil Procedure are an integral part of the
adversary system and all litigants are bound to abide by those
rules.

Some parties employ attorneys and engage them to

pursue a matter destined for litigation long before a case is
actually filed. Others may not consult an attorney until the
litigation actually commences. Still others may never retain
an attorney and will proceed through the court system as pro
se parties.

Each is equally bound by, and entitled to, the

protections of the rules, regardless of when or whether an
attorney is retained.
This concept is especially critical in the application
of Rule 26. Every party to a lawsuit, whether represented by
counsel or not, has an equal interest in maintaining the
privacy of its preparation and thought processes reflected in
"documents

and

tangible

things" which

anticipation of litigation or for trial."

are

"created

in

It is the purpose

of the preparation, not the credentials of the preparer that
is important.
Gold Standard suggests, however, that despite the plain
language of Rule 26, a party is only entitled to work product
protection once an attorney begins to oversee and manage the
litigation efforts on behalf of the party.

Presumably, this

would mean that a party who does not have an attorney prior
to commencement of a case would have to disclose all notes or

documents created in anticipation of the litigation, yet the
same party would be entitled to protection if he had employed
an attorney to accomplish the identical purposes.

Worse

still, under Gold Standard's position, a pro se party would
never be entitled to work product protection, even as to
litigation plans or notes of mental impressions prepared on
the eve of trial.

Yet in fact, those who prepare for

litigation and trial without the assistance of an attorney
are, in many respects, more dependant upon the court and the
procedural rules to protect them from their adversary.
This is not merely an issue of whether the resources are
available to employ an attorney; it is equally an issue of
company management style. Some companies, such as Texaco and
Getty, prefer to use its management to oversee many litigation
related efforts, especially in the early stages of a dispute.
Such was the case here. Not only was Ed Wendt, a nonattorney,
asked to coordinate the legal review of the Mercur situation,
he

was

asked

to

personally

be

responsible

for

the

investigation related to Gold Standard's threats. In another
company, this responsibility may well have been delegated
directly to someone in the legal department.
The decision regarding whether an attorney or a direct
line executive oversees a litigation related project is simply
and solely a question of management style.

The work product

rule was not intended to be blindly rigid so as to prevent the
company who utilizes management for such responsibilities from
claiming work product protection for those documents which are
created in anticipation of litigation (and which would have

been protected had a member of the legal staff been assigned
responsibility).
Courts and commentators alike agree that parties and
their nonattorney agents are properly covered by the Rule.
The Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rule expressly
affirm the intent of the Rule's plain language:
Subdivision (b)(3) reflects the trend of cases
by requiring a special showing, not merely as
to materials prepared by an attorney, but also
as to materials prepared in anticipation of
litigation or preparation of trial by or for
a party or any representative acting on his
behalf.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory Committee Notes, 48 F.R.D. 487,
502 (1970) (emphasis added).

Professor Moore emphasizes:

[T]here is no distinction between materials
prepared by the attorney in the case and those
that are prepared by a claim agent, insurer,
or other agent of the party or by the party
himself.
Therefore, the involvement of an
attorney is not a prerequisite to the
application of Rule 26(b)(3).
4 Moore's Federal Practice, § 26.64[2] at 26-358 to 26-360
(1987) (footnotes omitted). See also 8 C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2024 at 207 (1970).
A number of courts considering this issue have similarly
concluded that a party or its representative can create
protectable

work product without

the

involvement

of an

attorney. In Moore v. Tri-City Hospital Authority, 118 F.R.D.

This court has recently noted that where "the Utah rule [of
Civil Procedure] is identical in all material respects to [the]
federal rule," "[t]here is no reason to believe that the drafters
of the Utah rule had any intention to depart from the substantive
judgments made by the federal rule's drafters."
Madsen v.
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 249 n.4 (Utah 1988) (construing Utah R.
Civ. P. 41) .

646 (N.D. Ga. 1988), the defendant sought to compel production
of diary entries which were recorded by the plaintiff over a
two month period prior to the time he first consulted with
legal

counsel.

The

lawsuit

involved

the

plaintiff's

termination as a hospital Chaplain and he testified in an
affidavit that he began formulating plans for a law suit and
recorded notes in his diary several months before consulting
an attorney.

The court properly focused on the question of

whether the plaintiff prepared the entries "in anticipation
of litigation:"
Plaintiff has demonstrated that these entries
were made in contemplation of the litigation
in this particular case. [citation omitted]
The mere fact that plaintiff's assertion of
work-product includes the month and a half
period before plaintiff retained counsel is not
determinative.
Id. at 650.
In Duplan Corp. v. Peering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215
(4th Cir. 1975) , the appellant made the same argument that
Gold Standard makes here:
The thrust of the [appellants7] argument as to
these documents [created by a non-attorney] is
that they were not generated by trial counsel,
were not generated for or at his request, and
were not a part of or related to any legitimate
trial preparation.
Id. at 1219.

The Court rejected the appellant's position,

concluding that 26(b) (3) clearly can apply to the work of nonlawyers created in anticipation of litigation.

Id. See also

Eoppolo v. National RR Passenger Corp., 108 F.R.D. 292, 29495 (E.D. Pa. 1985) ("It is not necessary for an attorney to
be involved in the proceeding to bar discovery").
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The Colorado

Supreme Court, interpreting

Colorado's

identical work product rule, has similarly held:
C.R.C.P. 26(b)(3), like Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3),
draws no distinction between trial preparation
materials compiled by an attorney and those
prepared by some other agent of a party.
Hawkins v. District Court. 638 P.2d 1372, 1377 (Colo. 1982)
(footnote omitted).

The court in Hawkins explained the only

relevance of an attorney's involvement:
The significance of documents, reports and
statements being prepared by or under the
direction of an attorney, rather than a
nonattorney agent of a party, is that the
attorney's participation is some indication
that
the
materials
were
prepared
in
anticipation of litigation or for trial.
Hawkins, 638 P.2d at 1377 n.4.

An attorney's participation

or oversight is not controlling; it is merely one factor among
many which a court must weigh in determining whether a
document was created

in anticipation

of litigation and,

therefore, eligible for work product protection.
C.

The Two Memoranda Were Created in Anticipation of
Litigation and Are Protected Work Product Under Rule
26(b)(3).
Regardless of whether a document is created under the

supervision of the party

or its attorney, the relevant

question

Was

is

the

same:

the

document

anticipation of litigation or for trial?"
protects

the

doctrine

from

wholesale

"created

in

This standard

and

unrestrained

application to ordinary business documents while at the same
time effectuating the purposes for which it was created. The
factual circumstances supporting the Court's ruling that the
Memoranda are work product are compelling.

On June 28, 1984

Getty received several letters from Gold Standard in which
Gold Standard asserted that Getty had failed to provide a
feasibility study, that Getty's conduct formed "the basis of
a possible legal action" and that Getty "might have a legal
disclosure responsibility" as a result.

Addendum Item 10.

Within a few days of receiving these allegations, Reals, the
recipient of Gold Standard's threatening letter, requested
that Ed Wendt, President of Getty Mining, oversee a review of
the allegations and coordinate legal review.

Among other

things, Wendt contacted John Mintz, told him that Gold
Standard was threatening legal action and asked Mintz to
assist.

Mintz instructed Charles Kundert to undertake a
•

i'

. . .

review of Los Angeles files on the feasibility study issue.
John Mintz, the executive who requested the information from
Kundert, testified that he understood that Gold Standard was
threatening

litigation

and

that

the

performed in response to that threat.
Aff. at f 4).

project

was

being

R. at 2715-14 (Mintz

The resulting review was promptly transmitted

to Mr. Wendt.
The facts make it clear that the review was undertaken
as the result of Gold Standard's threats of legal action.
This is not a situation where management made a decision to

Ed Wendt's inability to recall in his deposition the
precise details of his response to Reals' request does not alter
the facts as they have been developed. John Mintz did recall the
communications between Wendt and himself. Getty should not be
penalized for the fading of memories of its former employees with
the passing of several years time. Gold Standard controlled the
timing of filing the lawsuit and must live with the fact that
memories have faded and that the facts are now more difficult to
piece together.

investigate a routine internal matter out of an abundance of
caution prior to actual threats from third parties.

The

memoranda were created in direct response to very detailed and
clear threats from a potential adversary that later did in
fact sue Getty and Texaco over those allegations.

Virtually

no court has taken a position that the work product doctrine
applies only after a suit is actually filed.

These are

exactly the type of pre-lawsuit documents which the work
product doctrine was intended to protect.
D.

The Kundert and Mintz Memoranda Were Prepared in Response
to Direct Threats From an Opposing Party. Not in the
Ordinary Course of Getty's Business, Making Thomas Organ
and Its Progeny Inapplicable to this Case.
Some courts have struggled over drawing a line between

activities performed in the ordinary course of a company's
business and those performed in anticipation of litigation.
Difficult line-drawing is not necessary here, however: Getty
clearly created the Memoranda in anticipation of litigation.
Gold Standard relies heavily upon a line of cases which
originated

with

Thomas Organ

Co. v. Jadranska

Slobodna

Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367, (N.D. 111. 1972) , an insurance claim
investigation case, to argue that "a document cannot possibly
qualify for work product protection if no lawyer has any
involvement in its preparation."

Appellant's Brief at 23.

The approach taken by Thomas Organ and its progeny has been
criticized by commentators and courts alike, even in its
application to insurance investigation cases. Professor Moore
states:
By ruling that "no document authored prior to the
consultation of an attorney may be deemed to have
been prepared in anticipation of litigation," the

Thomas decision misinterprets the purpose of the
1970 amendment.
4 Moored Federal Practice. % 26.64[2], at 26-360 n.23.

The

court in Basinger v. Glacier Carriers, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 771
(M.D. Pa. 1985) noted:
The Thomas Organ view has been rejected by many
courts as contrary to the intent of the 1970
amendments to Rule 26(b).
As one court noted,
"Thomas's flat requirement of a lawyer7s involvement
raises a bump which the 1970 Amendments had smoothed
over. . . ."
Id. at 773 (quoting Spauldina v. Denton. 68 F.R.D. 342, 345
(D. Del. 1975)).
Even if Thomas Organ is not rejected outright, its
holding

should

be

read

narrowly.

Insurance

routinely investigate claims before paying them.

companies
Relying on

the date when attorneys first become involved with a claim
offers a simple, albeit crude and potentially misleading,
method for a court to draw a line between an insurance
company's

ordinary

business

of claims

investigation

and

preparation for potential litigation. Outside the context of
insurance claims investigation, such a "bright line" test is
simply unnecessary and prejudicial to those who do not chose
to retain an attorney at the first threat of litigation.

In

a business such as mining, the type of investigation conducted
by Kundert was certainly not ordinary nor reoccurring.
While rejecting the plain reading of the Utah Rule, Gold
Standard urges the Court to apply the holding of an Illinois
case to construe the Utah Rule.

The Illinois decision in

Consolidation Coal Company v. Bucyrus-Erie Company, 432 N.E.2d
250 (111. 1982), relied upon extensively by Gold Standard, is

factually and legally so different from this case as to render
it valueless in deciding this case under the Utah Rule.

The

Illinois rule is uniquely restrictive among work product
rules:
Material prepared by or for a party in
preparation for trial is subject to discovery
only if it does not contain or disclose the
theories, mental impressions, or litigation
plans of the party's attorney.
Illinois

Court

Rule

201(b)(2)

added). 13

(emphasis

In

Consolidation Coal, supra, the Illinois Supreme Court simply
applied the express language of its restrictive work product
provision and concluded that a memorandum

created by a

nonattorney did not contain an attorneys' theories, mental
impressions or litigation plans.

Admittedly, the Memoranda

here do not contain an attorney's mental impressions or
litigation plans. But, unlike the Illinois rule, that is not
required under the Utah Rule.
Gold Standard argues that management investigations are
not

protected

"even

though

prepared

in anticipation

litigation."

Appellant's Brief at 28.

incorrect

not

and

supported

by

cases

of

This is simply
interpreting

Rule

Gold Standard acknowledges in a footnote that the Illinois
Rule "'differs significantly from the more broadly protective
Federal rule,'" but inexplicably asserts that the differences in
the language are "irrelevant here" and that the case should be used
as "persuasive authority" in interpreting the meaning of the Utah
Rule. In fact, the Illinois rule is so different from the Utah
Rule as to render decisions under the former essentially useless
in Utah.
Not surprisingly, the Consolidation Coal case has never
been cited for its work product holding in a reported opinion
outside of Illinois, yet has been cited by numerous Illinois
courts.

26(b)(3). In the cases cited by Gold Standard, the courts did
not conclude that the investigations involved were created "in
anticipation of litigation."

Indeed, several of the cases

expressly ruled that they were not.
The internal

investigations

in cases cited by Gold

Standard were conducted by the company prior to receiving
direct threats or allegation of misconduct or legal liability
from an opponent.

Whether the claim is based on tort or

breach of contract, the "mere contingency" that litigation may
result is not enough.
affirmative
contingency."
Standard

steps,

Until the potential opponent takes
the

litigation

remains

a

"mere

But when a potential adversary, like Gold

in this

case, makes particularized

and direct

allegations of legal liability, an opposing party should be
able to begin preparations to defend itself against the
specific allegations asserted by its opponent, without fear
of compelled disclosure of its preparation to the accusing
party.

Litigation is no longer speculative, it is a real

possibility once such direct threats have been made.

Gold

Standard argues, without support, that it should be able to

See Soeder v. General Dynamics Corp. , 90 F.R.D. 253 D. Nev.
1980) (defendant conceded that the reports were "prepared routinely
after every plane crash," no evidence of specific threats of
litigation); Janicker v. George Washington Univ., 94 F.R.D. 648
(D.D.C. 1982) (report prepared following fire; no mention of
threats of litigation from potential plaintiffs); Coastal States
Gas Corp. v. D.O.E., 617 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (no indication
that there "was even the dimmest expectation of litigation" at time
documents were drafted); Consolidation Coal, supra (investigation
of wheel excavator collapse; no indication of specific threats by
opponents); Hensel Phelps Const. Co. v. Southwestern Roofing &
Sheetmetal Co. , 29 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1095 (D. Colo. 1980) (the
stated purpose of report on defective roofing was to identify and
repair problems; no evidence of threats of litigation).
Paap

?Q

discover documents which were created by Getty as a direct
result of Gold Standard's own threats of legal action against
Getty.

Getty's investigation is the very type of material

created early in a case which the work product doctrine was
designed to protect.

Once a party asserts legal claims

against another, it should not be entitled to build its case
on the work done by the other party in response to those
threats.
The "battleground" of the work product doctrine under the
Utah and Federal Rule is whether the document was prepared "in
anticipation of litigation," not whether there was attorney
15
involvement as Gold Standard claims.
cited by Gold Standard

Many of the cases

focus on whether documents were

"prepared in anticipation of litigation."

In Simon v. G.D.

Searle Co., 816 F.2d 397, 401 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 484
U.S. 917 (1987) the court concluded that risk management
documents containing aggregate reserve information from a
large number of cases was not protected work product because
it was created for "business planning purposes including
budget, profit and insurance considerations."
result,

the

"business

court

planning

concluded
functions"

that
and

the

documents

"were

prepared in anticipation of litigation."

Id.

not

As a
served

themselves

Id. at 401.

1

Attorney involvement is neither necessary nor sufficient.
Even when a document was created solely by an attorney, a court
still must determine whether it was created "in anticipation of
litigation."
16

Even in Scott Paper Co. v. Ceilcote Co., Inc., 103 F.R.D.
591 (D. Ma. 1984) , upon which Gold Standard places so much
reliance, the court concludes that "[t]he primary motivating

The outcome of the Simon case would be the same under the
test applied by the district court in this case.

Unlike the

Getty Memoranda, the risk management documents in Simon, were
not created as a result of specific threats from a potential
adversary nor did they involve consideration of the factual
allegations raised by an adversary. 17 The Memoranda in this
case were prepared immediately on the heels of receiving
allegations of legal liability from a potential adverse party.
Gold

Standard

repeatedly

asserts that the district

court's order somehow conceals "the truth."

Getty strongly

disagrees with Gold Standard's characterization. The Kundert
and Mintz Memoranda are nothing more than an opinion by
Kundert as to whether certain documents contained in Getty's
Los Angeles files (not Salt Lake's files) would constitute a
bankable feasibility study. These are not even the documents

(...continued)
purpose behind the report was not to aid in possible litigation
[citations omitted], but to foster a commercial disposition of the
controversy that would obviate any need for litigation." Id. at
597. As in Simon, the court did not discuss specific allegations
of legal liability which were made against the a party prior to the
time it prepared a document.
17
Gold Standard also asserts that a few cases have indicated
that the author of a document must be aware of the intended purpose
of the document. The only cases cited, however, establish no such
requirement. In E.E.O.C. v. Commonwealth Edison. 119 F.R.D. 3 94
(N.D. 111. 1988), the court concluded that no one within
Commonwealth, including the author of the memoranda, anticipated
litigation. In fact, the court specifically looked beyond the
author of the memoranda to determine whether the company itself had
adopted a "litigation mindset" at the time of the employee's
investigation.
Similarly, in Scott Paper, supra. there is no
indication that the employee was assigned by someone else, attorney
or executive, to prepare the memoranda. Certainly, if an employee
creates a document without a request from others, that person's
intent must be controlling.
In this case, however, Kundert
testified that he understood that he was performing the project
under the direction of Mintz. Record at 2647 (Kundert Depo at 47) .

given to Gold Standard which Getty contends constitute the
feasibility study.

The opinions expressed in the Memoranda

not only do not go to the ultimate issue, they would be
extremely misleading.
II.
GOLD STANDARD FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE DOCUMENTS SHOULD BE
PRODUCED UNDER THE EXCEPTION SET FORTH IN RULE 2 6(b)(3)
Gold Standard argues that, even if the Memoranda are work
product, it is entitled to their contents under the exception
set forth in Rule 26(b)(3).

Gold Standard fails to qualify

under that exception for at least three reasons.

First, the

Memoranda contain mental impressions, opinions and conclusions
to which the exception does not apply. Second, Gold Standard
fails to demonstrate either "substantial need" or "undue
hardship" as required by the exception.

Finally, Gold

Standard made no showing to the district court to satisfy its
burden of proving the elements of the exception.
A.

The Memoranda Contain Opinions, Conclusions and Mental
Impressions Which are Not Discoverable, Even Upon a
Showing of Substantial Need and Undue Hardship.
Under Rule 26(b)(3), the substantial need and undue

hardship exception applies only to factual information in a
work

product

document

and

expressly

excludes

"mental

impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney or other representative of a party."
P. 26(b)(3).

Utah R. Civ.

In Uoiohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,

101 S. Ct. 677 (1981), the Supreme Court stated:
As Rule 26 and Hickman make clear, such [opinion]
work product cannot be disclosed simply on a showing

of substantial need and inability
equivalent without undue hardship.

to

obtain

the

Id., 449 U.S. at 401, 101 S. Ct. at 688.
Although much of the two Memoranda consist of mental
impressions, opinions and conclusions of high level Getty
managers made

in response to Gold

Standard's threat of

litigation, Gold Standard discusses the exception as if it
18
applies to the entire contents of the documents.

The Rule,

and

that

cases

interpreting

it, clearly

establish

the

opinions, conclusions and mental impressions of Kundert and
Mintz are simply not discoverable under the standard set forth
by Gold Standard.
It is precisely the fact that the Memoranda contain
mental impressions, conclusions and opinions of "high level
Getty

managers,"

prepared

in

response

to

threats

of

litigation, that makes Gold Standard so anxious to have the
Memoranda.

And yet that is the reason why the rule provides

almost complete protection for opinion work product —

to

prevent the opponent from discovering the mental processes and
opinions of a party or its representative, recorded as a
result of the opponent's own threats of legal action.
Courts considering disclosure of opinion work product
have held that it is rarely, if ever, discoverable.

See,

Gold Standard disregards the distinction between fact and
opinion work product, but it recognizes that the documents contain
opinions and mental impressions:
"Mr. Kundert was simply
'reporting his and others' perceptions of the opposing party's
position . . . ." Appellant's Brief at 31. It characterizes the
opinions as "bald admissions by upper Getty management," (id. at
12) , and asserts that the Memoranda "contain the truth, at least

e.g. , In re Murphy. 560 F.2d

326, 336

(8th Cir. 1977)

("opinion work product enjoys a nearly absolute immunity and
can be

discovered

only

in very

rare

and

extraordinary

circumstances") ; Connolly Data Systems v. Vector Technologies,
Inc. , 114 F.R.D. 89, 95 (S.D. Cal. 1987). "Indeed, it appears
that such opinion work product enjoys an almost absolute
immunity from discovery.

Therefore, not even a showing of

substantial need, lack of substantial equivalent, and undue
hardship can force the disclosure of these materials." Laxalt
v. McClatchv. 116 F.R.D. 438, 441 (D. Nev. 1987) (citation
omitted).
131, 133

See also Carver v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 94 F.R.D.
(S.D.6a. 1982)

impressions

("The

rule is clear that mental

'shall' be protected, even

if a showing of

substantial need and hardship is made with respect to other
portions of a litigation document").
Without exception, the cases cited by 6old Standard
involved only the discovery of facts, not opinion.

In Gold

Standard's own quote from Hickman, the Court limited the
exception

to

"relevant

and

non-privileged

facts

essential to the preparation of one's case."

Appellant's

Brief at 34 (quoting Hickman) . Similarly, the decision by the
Utah Supreme Court in Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 245 P. 2d
224 (Utah 1952), was limited to discovery of fact statements
of witnesses to a train accident which the court held were not
work product under a prior Utah Rule.

The work product

involved in Klaiber v. Orzel, 714 P.2d 813 (Ariz. 1986),
consisted of factual statements from witnesses regarding the
amount of alcohol consumed by a driver prior to a fatal car

accident.

None of these cases considered opinion work

product and Gold Standard provides no support for requiring
disclosure of opinion work product in this case.
The near-absolute protection provided for opinion work
product

applies

to the opinions

of the party

and its

nonattorney representatives as well. See, e.g.. Duplan Corp.
v. Peering Milliken. Inc., 540 F.2d 1215, 1219 (4th Cir. 1976)
("Opinion work product immunity now applies egually to lawyers
and non-lawyers alike.")
Retorderie

(quoting Duplan v. Moulinage et

de Chavanoz. 509 F.2d 730

(4th Cir. 1974))

(emphasis added); Laxalt v. McClatchy, 116 F.R.D. 438, 442 (D.
Nev. 1987) ("The work product rule ... was adopted to shield
the mental impressions and legal theories of a party's counsel
or other representative") (citing Eoppolo v. National R.R.
Passenger Corp.. 108 F.R.D. 292 (E.D.Pa. 1985) (emphasis
added); United States v. Chatham City Corp., 72 F.R.D. 640,
643 n.3 (S.D.Ga. 1976) ("[T]he impressions, opinions and
conclusions of the attorneys or representatives of a party are
not disclosable ... [and] [t]his protection is absolute.");
Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 87 Cal.App.3d 626, 151
Cal.Rptr. 399, 410 (1978).
Gold Standard urges the Court to adopt an interpretation
of Rule 26(b)(3) which contradicts and completely ignores the

See also Southern Railway Co. v. Lanham. 403 F.2d 119 (5th
Cir. 1968) (disclosure of eyewitness statements taken shortly after
a train accident); Augenti v. Cappellini, 84 F.R.D. 73 (M.D. Pa.
1979) (plaintiff's contemporaneous recollections of events relating
to attempts to "deprogram" him away from the Unification Church).

language of Rule 26(b)(3).

It has provided no basis for

overcoming the protection accorded to opinion work product.
B.

Gold Standard Has Not Satisfied its Burden of Proving
That it Has Substantial Need for the Documents or that
it Cannot Obtain the Substantial Equivalent Through Other
Means.
Even for factual work product to qualify under the

exception to Rule 26(b)(3), a party must show 1) that it has
a "substantial need of the materials in the preparation of
[its] case;" and 2) that it is "unable without undue hardship
to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means."

Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).

Laxalt v. McClatchv, 116

F.R.D. 438, 441 (D. Nev. 1987).20

Gold Standard failed to

make the required showing to the district court.
1.

Gold Standard has Failed to Establish a Substantial Need
for the Memoranda, Despite Its Characterization of the
Documents as "Unique Smoking Gun Evidence."
Gold Standard repeatedly asserts that the memoranda are

invaluable in the preparation of its case. It states that the
memoranda are essential because "one thing plaintiff must
prove in this case is that the Bechtel report was not the
contractually agreed upon feasibility study, and that Getty
knew it."

Appellant's Brief at 36.

Yet Gold Standard

entirely fails to tell the court that the documents discussed
by Kundert and Mintz in their memoranda are not the documents

Four of the six cases upon which Gold Standard relies in
attempting to squeeze the memoranda into this exception to the work
product rule were decided prior to enactment of the 1970 amendment
and Utah's subsequent adoption of the Rule.
Such cases are
potentially misleading and Wright and Miller wisely caution that
"pre-1970 cases must be resorted to with discrimination and care."
8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2023, at
193 (1970).

which Getty gave Gold Standard in July 1981 to constitute the
21
"contractually agreed upon feasibility study."

Thus, the

opinions of Kundert and Mintz concerning the initial Bechtel
report do not even speak to the real issue of whether the
Final Bechtel Study, with its attachments, provided to Gold
Standard in June and July, 1981, satisfied the requirements
of the Operating Agreement. A fortiori, the Memoranda do not
speak to the allegation that Getty knew that it had not
provided Gold Standard with a feasibility

study.

Gold

Standard has made no showing that the documents are crucial
to its case.

If anything, the Memoranda are misleading and

confusing because they concern different documents from those
which Getty maintains constituted the feasibility study.
Gold Standard argues that the documents are discoverable
work product because they are "unique catalysts in the search
for truth."

Appellants Brief at 36 (quoting Auaenti v.

Cappellini, 84 F.R.D. 73 (M.D.Pa. 1979)).

In Auaenti, the

court opined that statements of a plaintiff were "unique

In fact, Mr. Kundert expressly stated in his memorandum
that, "[wje have no knowledge of what documents were submitted to
Gold Standard to satisfy the requirement of the Agreement." R. at
2596 (Addendum Item Number 1).
In his deposition, Kundert testified that he was not aware
of what documents Getty gave to Gold Standard in 1981:
Q.
And are you aware of additional
information that Getty provided to Mr. Smith at
or about the time that the final Bechtel report
was given to him?
A
No, because as of October [1], 1980, we
[Los Angeles management] had been removed, and
this was later.
R. at 2642 (Kundert Depo. at 57) .

catalysts in the search for truth" because they contained
contemporaneously recorded recollections of factual events.
Almost without exception, the only documents held to
qualify as "unique catalysts," have been contemporaneously
22

recorded eyewitness accounts of an event.

In contrast, the

Memoranda in this case merely review documents created and
statements made more than three years earlier. Gold Standard
offers no support for classifying a memorandum which reviews
documents
catalyst."

years

after

they

were

To the contrary, the

created

as

information

a

"unique

is easily

replicated by reference to the original documents Kundert used
in his review.
Simply asserting that it has substantial need for the
memoranda is insufficient to overcome the protection provided
even ordinary work product material under Rule 26(b) (3) . Gold
Standard has failed to establish any substantial need for the
memoranda in proceeding with this case.
2.
Gold Standard Has Made No Shoving of Undue Hardship in
Obtaining the Substantial Equivalent of the Two Memoranda
by Other Means.
Even if Gold Standard could demonstrate a substantial
need for the Memoranda, it has never made a showing that it
is unable

to

obtain

the

substantial

equivalent

of the

protected material by other means without undue hardship.
"Substantial equivalent" does not require an exact duplicate.
Gold Standard argues that simply because the documents are

See, e.g., Fontaine v. Sunflower Beef Carrier, Inc. ,
F.R.D. 89 (D. Mo. 1980); Teribery v. Norfolk & Western Railway,
F.R.D. 46 (W.D. Pa. 1975); McDouaall v. Dunn, 468 F.2d 468 (
Cir. 1972).

unique, they

should

be discoverable.

Of

course, such

reasoning is circular since all documents are unique in some
respects.

Gold Standard must demonstrate that it cannot

obtain the substantial equivalent of the information contained
in the documents without undue hardship. Not only did it fail
to make such a showing in the district court (see infra
section I I . C ) , its arguments made in this Court similarly
fail to satisfy this requirement of the rule.
Nearly all of the factual information contained in the
Memoranda is taken directly from documents. Gold Standard has
made no showing that the documents themselves are unavailable.
For

example,

Gold

Standard

asserts

that

the

following

information contained in Kundert's Memorandum is unavailable
through other means:
[T]he Data Room Index of material sent by our
Salt Lake Office for Mercur, shows NO FEASIBILITY
STUDIES.
Appellant's Brief, at 37 (quoting Kundert Memorandum). Getty
has

produced

the

Data

Room

Index

quoted

by

Kundert.

Certainly, the Index itself is superior to Kundert's hearsay
reference to

it.

Similarly, all of the other factual

information contained in the Memoranda can be obtained by
reference to documents available to Gold Standard.
Standard

has made

no

showing

that

this

Gold

information

is

unavailable.
Gold

Standard

similarly

asserts

the

substantial

equivalent of Kundert's account of a conversation he had with
Hautala, as well as Kundert's hearsay report of a conversation
between J.P. Davies and Hautala, is unavailable through other

means.

Gold Standard has made no showing that it attempted

to obtain substantially equivalent information through any
other means, including by questioning Hautala or Davies about
the conversations.

Again, Gold Standard has engaged in ex

parte contact with both of these witness, neither of whom have
any ongoing relationship with Texaco or Getty.

Furthermore,

the substantial equivalent of the information revealed in
those

conversations

documents.

may

be

available

in depositions

or

Gold Standard has simply made no showing of

unavailability and cannot now attempt to make a showing in the
first instance.
Finally, Gold Standard bases its claim of undue hardship
on several additional arguments, none of which merits reversal
of the district court's ruling.

First, Gold Standard cites

two cases supporting the general proposition that if a witness
is

hostile,

a

deposition

may

not

always

produce

the

substantial equivalent of the facts contained in work product
documents. Gold Standard then boldly asserts, without support
in the Record, that both Kundert and Mintz are "hostile
witnesses."

Appellant's Brief at 40.

Yet, neither man has

any financial stake in the outcome of the case and neither has
any ongoing relationship with Texaco or Getty.

Kundert

himself testified that he has no current connection with Getty
whatsoever.

He further stated:

I have no ax to grind one way or the other and I
told everybody involved I'll be happy to do whatever
I can and say what happened as far as I remember.
R. at 2646 (Kundert Depo. at 48) . Additionally, as indicated
above, Gold Standard already made ex parte contact with

Kundert and drafted an affidavit which he signed• This hardly
sounds like the hostile witness Gold Standard
portray.

seeks to

Pure speculation that the witnesses will be hostile

is not sufficient to show undue hardship, especially when the
facts contradict such an assertion.

In re Davco Corp.

Securities Litigation, 99 F.R.D. 616, 621 (S.D.Ohio 1983); 4
Moore's Federal Practice % 26.64 [3-1] (2d ed. 1981).
Gold Standard also points to a supposed discrepancy
between the opinions of Kundert and Mintz, as expressed in
their memoranda,

and

later

statements made

by

them

in

documents, some of which are not part of the Record on Appeal
23
and thus not properly before the court.
of a discrepancy is not enough.

Yet mere conjecture

See J. Moore, Federal

Practice § 26.64; Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2025 at p. 226-27. See also Klaiber v. Orzel, 714
P.2d 813, 818 (Ariz. 1986).

Furthermore, the discrepancy to

which Gold Standard points, results not from contradictory
testimony, but from Gold Standard's attempts to apply the
opinions contained in the Memoranda to different documents
from those which Kundert reviewed.

See Appellant's Brief, at 39 n.13, wherein Appellant
informs the Court that it "has taken the liberty of attaching the
few referenced pages" of the Mintz Deposition, which "is not
technically a part of the record in this case." Xd. Later in its
Brief Appellant again "takes the liberty of putting [documents]
before this Court" which it admits were "not made part of the
record before the trial court."
Id. at 42 n.16.
Appellees
respectfully object to the repeated reliance on facts and documents
not not properly before the Court. This emphasizes the weakness
of its position before the district court. Even if relevant new
facts have arisen, they are for the trial court to examine and
weigh in the first instance.

Gold Standard is unable to prove from the record that it
has met the requirements necessary for discovering factual
work product.

It failed to convince the trial court that it

had a substantial need of the materials or that it was unable
to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials from
other sources.

Clearly, Gold Standard has made no showing

that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the
memoranda constitute protected work product.
C.

Gold Standard Failed to Satisfy Its Burden of Proving
that the Memoranda Fall Within the Exception to Work
Product Protection,
An examination of the Record demonstrates that Gold

Standard made absolutely no showing of substantial need and
undue hardship in the district court. Its entire argument to
the court consisted of two sentences in its brief:
Gold Standard has substantial need of the document
to show the depth and extent of Getty's knowledge
of the validity of Gold Standard's claims. Gold
Standard will suffer undue hardship by failing to
allow it to keep these documents as Wendt, Getty
Mining's President, and Reals, Texaco's Vice
President, have both testified that they cannot
recall ever seeing the documents or ever being
apprised of their conclusions.
R. at 3192.
Gold Standard offered no affidavits or other evidence to
support its two-sentence conclusory statement. The burden is
on the party seeking discovery of work product documents to
show that the material fits within the exception.

Hodges,

Grant & Kaufmann v. United States, 768 F.2d 719, 721 (5th Cir.
1985); Lott v. Seaboard Systems R.R., 109 F.R.D. 554 (S.D. Ga.
1985). This court need only determine whether the trial court
abused its discretion. Brock v. Frank V. Panzarino, Inc., 109
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F.R.D. 157, 159 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("The trial court has wide
discretion in determining the existence of substantial need
and undue hardship").
III.
GETTY HAS NOT WAIVED THE WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right.

Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983).

To

waive a right, there must be an existing right, a knowledge
of its existence and an unequivocal intent to waive the right.
Id.

This determination is very fact particular and must be

decided on a case-by-case basis.

As a result, an appellate

court generally accords considerable deference to the finder
of fact's determination. Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1230
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Briaham City v. Mantua Town, 754 P.2d
1230,

123 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("Absent a showing that

[plaintiff] unequivocally intended to waive its right under
the provision, we will defer to the trial court ruling").
A determination of waiver in the privilege or work
product context is based on the same standard as waiver in
other contexts.

See Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v.

Servotronics, Inc. , 522 N.Y.S. 2d 999, 1004 (Sup. Ct. App.
Div. 1987) (as with waiver in other contexts, "[ijntent must
be the primary component of any waiver test"); Mendenhall v.
Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. Ill 1982).
The waiver question in this case varies substantially
from the waiver questions treated by the cases cited by Gold
Standard.

In the waiver cases cited by Gold Standard there

was no question raised regarding whether the producing party

knew of its right to withhold particular documents, only that
the documents were accidently disclosed despite knowledge of
its rights.
Standard,

In this case, as a result of actions by Gold

Getty

did

not

know, nor

could

it

reasonably

determine at the time it produced the two documents, that the
memoranda constituted work product.

The cases cited by Gold

Standard consider whether or not the producing party7s actions
implied an intent to waive work product protection, not
whether or not the party even knew of its right to assert the
protection.
In our case, the question of intent to waive need not
even be considered since Getty was without knowledge of its
right in the first place. Utah law provides that a party can
only waive a known right.

In a recent decision, the Utah

Court Appeals rejected a waiver claim because of evidence that
the party lacked the necessary knowledge:
The evidence does not demonstrate the Partnership
relinquished a known right. The Woods failed to
establish a primary element of waiver.
Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
(emphasis in original).
Since a party can only waive a known right, it follows
that a party cannot waive a right if it was acting under a
misapprehension of fact at the time. See Mid-Century Ins. Co.
v. Brown, 654 P. 2d 716, 720 (1982) ("one cannot waive that
which he does not know or where he has acted under a
misapprehension of facts"); Harris Bros. Const. Co. v. Crider,
497 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Ky. 1973) (same); International Ins. Co.
v. Jataine, 495 S.W.2d 309, 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (same).
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In order for Getty to waive its right to the work product
protection, it had to know of that right at the time it waived
it.24See Barnes, 750 P.2d at 1230. By the time Gold Standard
filed this lawsuit, no employees remained at Getty who were
familiar with the circumstances surrounding the creation of
any Mercur documents in 1984.

Gold Standard obtained the

document from Klatt and its counsel then contacted Kundert ex
parte and asked him to sign an affidavit which Gold Standard
prepared.

Kundert's statements in the affidavit made it

appear that the memorandum was created for a routine business
purpose rather than in anticipation of litigation. Getty had
no reason to question the explanation contained in Kundert's
Affidavit.

Without a good faith basis to object to the

production, Getty was in essence compelled to produce the
document pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure or subject
itself to sanctions.
It was only later, in Mr. Kundert's deposition that it
was discovered that he prepared the Memorandum at Mr. Mintz's
direction and that he had no direct knowledge of the purpose
for which the Memorandum was requested.

Only later, after

meeting with Mintz and Collins did Getty discover that the
Memoranda were created in anticipation of litigation with Gold
Standard.

Gold Standard had the burden of establishing that Getty had
knowledge of the facts at the time it allegedly waived its right
to work product protection. On appeal, this knowledge must be
demonstrated from information in the record. See Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 144, 87 S. Ct. 1975, 1986 (1967) (for

purposes of establishing a waiver, the court stated that it was
inappropriate to "determine whether a 'right or privilege' is
'known7 by relying on information outside the record").

Gold Standard makes much of the fact that Richard Klatt
saw the document while at Getty, took it with him when he left
Getty and later gave it to Gold Standard. These facts merely
highlight the unfairness to Getty of the method used by Gold
Standard to obtain the documents. The fact that Richard Klatt
read the documents while he was at Getty is irrelevant.
"Disclosure to a person with an interest common to that of the
attorney or the client normally is not inconsistent with an
intent to invoke the work product doctrine's protection and
would not amount to such a waiver." In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073,
1081 (4th Cir. 1981), cert, denied. 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
Work product protection is not waived when a document is
disclosed to others unless it is likely that the person will
give the document to the adversarial party. Klatt was a Getty
employee at the time he saw the document and Getty had no
reason to believe he would later become a paid consultant for
its adversary.

Gold Standard has cited no cases which hold

that a party waives work product protection by allowing its
own employee to read a protected document.
IV.
THE DISTRICT COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO CONTROL INFORMAL
DISCOVERY AND CAN PREVENT A PARTY FROM INVADING
ITS OPPONENT'S WORK PRODUCT RIGHTS THROUGH
EX PARTE CONTACTS WITH THE OPPONENTfS FORMER EMPLOYEES
This Court gives broad discretion to a district court to
control discovery.

Bennion v. Utah State Bd. of Oil, Gas &

Mining, 675 P.2d 1135, 1144

(Utah 1983).

Gold Standard

argues, however, that the Court lacks authority to prevent
disclosure of work product through informal discovery.

This

position would not only improperly circumscribe the ability

of the trial court to control discovery, it would encourage
and reward discovery abuse and sharp practices. Gold Standard
maintains that Rules 26-37 apply only to "formal" discovery
methods

and

*[b]y

their very

terms" "do

not

apply to

investigative efforts of a party outside the formal discovery
process."

Appellant's Brief at 47.

Neither Rule 26(b) or 26(c) limits its application to
"formal" discovery.

Such an interpretation of the scope of

the rule would permit an end run around the work product
protection of 26(b)(3) and could seriously jeopardize the
intended protection.
If the court is powerless to prevent a party from
obtaining an opposing party's work product through informal
discovery, then an opponent could seek disclosure of work
product materials from former secretaries or other employees
of the party or attorney or even from the former attorney
himself.

Such a rule would enable a disgruntled former

attorney, employee or other agent of a party to seriously
damage the party's trial preparation by disclosing, without
restraint, his former employer's entire case preparation and
trial strategy simply by "taking the documents home with him."
Whether or not the party could bring a legal action against
the former attorney or employee, it would have no recourse
against the opposing party which obtained the confidential
information.

Such a narrow interpretation of the trial

court's broad power to control discovery is simply absurd.
The few courts which have considered their own ability
to control informal discovery have agreed that they do have

such authority.

In Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v.

LeMay, 93 F.R.D. 379 (S.D. Ohio 1981), the defendants asserted
that a protective order entered by the court did not apply to
documents from third party witnesses obtained through what it
characterized as "informal" discovery.

The protective order

provided a method for identifying documents as "restricted
information."

The Court rejected the defendants7 assertion

that the court could not apply the protective order to
informal discovery:
The Protective Order, Plaintiffs contend, simply
does not apply to documents obtained outside of the
formal discovery process. . . .
*

*

*

Upon carefully reviewing the arguments of the
parties, this Court holds that the designation of
the
blueprints
in
question
as
"restricted
information" was proper.
The language of the
Protective Order, taken as a whole, seems to
encompass both "formal" and "informal" discovery,
to use the terms suggested by the Defendants. That
is, the Order can apply to information obtained
through discovery methods by counsel for one party
when counsel for the other party is not present.
This Court could find no case law authority for this
proposition (and parties have cited none), but it
is not foreclosed by the language of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(a), describing a variety of "discovery
methods."
Id. at 383 (emphasis in original).
Another court has specifically recognized its power to
prevent or remedy the disclosure of work product to an
opponent through informal discovery. In Amarin Plastics, Inc.
v. Maryland Cup Corp.. 116 F.R.D. 36 (D. Mass. 1987), the
court allowed attorneys to contact a former employee of the
opposing party, but emphasized that it had power to impose

sanctions if opposing counsel sought the disclosure of the
opponent's work product:
If [defendant] can demonstrate, either by a
deposition transcript or other evidence, that
[plaintiff's] counsel sought in any way to cause
[defendant's
former
employee]
to
divulge
confidential attorney-client communications or work
product to plaintiff's counsel, that conduct might
well constitute sufficiently abusive conduct to
impose sanctions.
Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
Gold

Standard

asserts

that

obtaining

work

product

documents from a former employee of the opposition falls into
the category of the ''type of investigation" that "parties and
their counsel are supposed to do." To the contrary, informal
discovery can only further the purposes of the adversary
system

if

it is conducted

so as to avoid

uncontrolled

disclosure of work product. Parties should not be allowed to
avoid

satisfying

the

standard

under

Rule

26(b)(3)

for

disclosure of work product by convincing former employees,
agents

or

attorneys

of

an

opponent

to

disclose

such

information.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling
that the Memoranda are protected under the work product
doctrine. The documents were created by Getty's employees in
anticipation of litigation arising from allegations of legal
liability which Gold Standard made against Getty a few days
before the Memoranda were requested.
The Memoranda

contain

summaries

of other

documents

located in Getty's Los Angeles office, as well as the mental

impressions and opinions of two Getty employees.

Protecting

the documents does not conceal "the truth" as Gold Standard
contends.

The Memoranda do not even discuss the documents

which Getty asserts constituted the feasibility study.

Gold

Standard's smug assertion that Getty is trying to conceal "the
truth" is offensive and false. The facts are fully available
to Gold Standard.

Gold Standard does not need the summaries

of documents when it has copies of the original documents
themselves. Opinions and mental impressions do not represent
"truth" but merely one persons interpretation of selected
facts which are equally available to all parties.

Gold

Standard has access to the same facts as Kundert did.
Gold Standard has demonstrated no reasoned basis for
requiring disclosure of the documents under the exception to
Rule 26(b)(3).

It made no showing of substantial need and

undue hardship.

The district court did not abuse

its

discretion and its decision should be affirmed.
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